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ACKERMANIA OR UNCOMFORTABLE 
TRUTHS? 
WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS. By Bruce 
Ackerman. 1 The Belknap Press Of Harvard University 
Press. Cambridge, Ma. Volume 2, 1998. Pp. xi, 515. 
$29.95. 
L.A. Powe, Jr. 2 
There is probably not a single constitutional scholar in the 
country who is not familiar with Bruce Ackerman's claim that 
Article V is not the exclusive means of constitutional amend-
ment. From his Storrs Lectures to the initial volume of his pro-
jected three volume set, We the People, Ackerman has argued 
that the Reconstruction and the New Deal constitute "constitu-
tional moments" of higher law-making at which the Constitution 
was fundamentally altered outside the formal amendment proc-
ess by "We the People" (a phrase Ackerman repeats as often as 
humanly possible). 
To say that Ackerman's thesis has been controversial is 
much like stating a Texas summer is warm. His argument, that 
under the proper historical conditions Americans can (and do) 
successfully engage in higher law-making, invites evaluation of 
both his historical and his constitutional claims. Reviewers of 
volume one, We the People: Foundations, were up to the task. 
Some claimed Ackerman's history was thin and sloppy; others 
found his legal thesis off the wall. A few, like Suzanna Sherry, 
agreed with both critiques.3 While everyone agreed volume one 
was a tour de force-really imaginative-if an up-down vote on 
the thesis could have been arranged, it is doubtful Ackerman 
could have carried the zip code 06520, much less anywhere else. 
1. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. 
2. Anne Green Regents Chair, The University of Texas. 
3. Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 Harv. L. Rev. YIX (I YY2). 
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Now, with a pause of seven years since volume one, he's 
back, unrepentant and as confident as before.~ Volume Two, We 
the People: Transformations, begins with a restatement of his 
thesis that allows all the old juices to begin flowing again. 
America, so Ackerman claims, has a tradition of dualist democ-
racy. At most times Americans are engaged in ordinary politics 
where the people wisely live a balanced life and the problems of 
the country are but one of many things, like a Monday Night 
Football game, competing for attention, and the output of the 
political class, even if unattractive, is basically untroubling. But 
periodically politics takes the center stage. In these periods of 
heightened awareness, it is possible, if appropriate conditions are 
met, for a majority of the American people to empower a branch 
of government to speak authoritatively in the name of "We the 
People" and permanently change the Constitution without re-
gard for forms of Article V. Thereafter, with the new changes in 
place, Americans can again revert to the pleasures of their nor-
mal lives, and the Supreme Court is duty-bound to apply the new 
Constitution to the cases coming before it. 
Having restated what he spent the bulk of Foundations lay-
ing out, Ackerman turns to what is new. What's new is history, 
lots of history, superb history. Ackerman's sophisticated discus-
sion of Reconstruction and the New Deal puts to rest any claim 
that his thesis rests on thin or sloppy history. 
Constitutional moments begin with a constitutional impasse, 
created (for example) by the functional unamendability of the 
Articles of Confederation, by slavery and secession, or by the 
perceived need to regulate the national economy. Constitutional 
moments end with consolidation as the dissenting institutions 
run up the white flag. At the Founding, North Carolina belat-
edly but voluntarily joined the eleven states ratifying the Consti-
tution, and Rhode Island then gave up when threatened with 
economic sanctions. After the Civil War, the Presidency even-
tually came into line with the Congress when Andrew Johnson 
yielded in 1868 under the threat of impeachment by the Senate, 
while the South provided the necessary ratifications of the Four-
teenth Amendment, and then the country elected U.S. Grant. 
During the New Deal, the Supreme Court caved in with Owen 
4. He even ends the new volume with a proposal that any president who serves 
two terms would be allowed to offer constitutional amendments which, if approved by 
the voters at the next two presidential elections, would become part of the Constitution. 
(p. 410) Perhaps Ackerman was influenced by Bill Clinton's concern over the "legacy" 
thing. In any event, I will leave analysis of this proposal to those who may care. 
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Roberts' "switch in time that saves nine," and shortly thereafter 
FDR gained eight appointments. 
Ackerman begins with a winning illustration because the 
Founding Era did engage in higher law-making in creating the 
Constitution. The delegates at Philadelphia had to exceed their 
instructions (by miles). The Articles of Confederation had to be 
ignored because not only did they proclaim a "perpetual union," 
they required unanimity for any proposed changes-something 
that, at a minimum, "Rogue" Island would never allow. I had 
thought I was basically familiar with the sources of the Found-
ing, but Ackerman's analysis, showing unconventional uses of 
existing institutions against persistent claims of illegitimacy, is 
far richer than what I had known.5 
Ackerman enthusiastically boasts that if extraconstitutional 
measures were good for the Framers (with their limited concept 
of direct democracy) and the nation, then they can be even bet-
ter for subsequent generations, which have a more mature and 
inclusive view of democracy. Naturally, constitutional moments 
are rare. We have had none in the past six decades, so the New 
Deal's constitutional synthesis continues to govern Americans. 
Like Foundations, Transformations demands attention both 
to the history it presents and to the non-Article V thesis it ex-
pounds. Copying John Marshall in McCulloch on the Tenth 
Amendment, Ackerman holds that if the Framers wanted Arti-
cle V to be exclusive, ''they could have written an explicit pro-
viso: 'This Constitution can only be amended when .... "' (p. 
72) (emphasis in original) (This from someone who believes 
everyone who disagrees with him is a ''hypertextualist"!) While 
the thesis remains roughly the same, Transformations' history is 
first-rate not only at the Founding, but at Reconstruction and 
the New Deal as well. Ackerman fully validates his historical 
descriptive claim, and while some would like to undo the New 
Deal, presumably no one is so bold as to claim the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments should be deemed void. There-
fore, Ackerman rightly demands that there be an explanation for 
the changes in our constitutional understanding that is consistent 
with the historical facts, and he claims that only his approach ac-
complishes the necessary work. 
Because there can be no legitimate debate as to whether the 
Founding was a constitutional moment where the old forms of 
5. This sentence could be repeated for both Reconstruction and the New Deal. 
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constitutional change were rejected,h I will focus first on Recon-
struction and then on the New Deal. After offering more praise, 
I will turn to the harder questions of what to make of a very 
compelling historical narrative and whether its implications can 
be honestly avoided. 
RECONSTRUCTION 
Let's begin with some numbers. In 1865 there were thirty-
six states; eleven were in the Confederacy and by Appomattox, 
twenty-five states supported the national cause. There were two 
theories on which an amendment could be ratified. First it could 
secure either twenty-seven (3/4 of 36) states. Alternatively, it 
might need only nineteen Union ratifications (3/4 of the 25) on 
the assumption that the Southern states were out until brought 
back in. Lincoln believed that excluding the Confederate states 
from the ratification process "'would be questionable and sure to 
be persistently questioned"' (p. 148) and in the brief period in 
which exclusion was viable, even the radical Henry Wilson, who 
thought it legitimate, eschewed reliance upon the nineteen 
Northern ratifications. 
The Confederacy presented a constitutional dilemma. Once 
Andrew Johnson started with his vetoes, if the South were ad-
mitted to Congress, its representatives could join with Northern 
Democrats to block any legislation implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment and, indeed, any further constitutional change. Yet 
if the South were excluded as states, no constitutional amend-
ments beyond the Thirteenth could hope to achieve nineteen 
Northern ratifications.7 
On December 18, 1865, Secretary of State William Seward 
proclaimed the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified by the 
requisite twenty-seven states (including the constitutionally in-
triguing West Virginia as well as eight from the Confederacy). 
Yet, two weeks earlier, Republican majorities in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress had refused to seat Southern Representatives 
and Senators. The exclusion included Horace Maynard from 
eastern Tennessee, even though he had been seated during the 
Civil War! 
6. Like the Confederacy, eleven states seceded from the "perpetual union" de-
clared by the Articles. Only this time the remaining (two) states joined them. 
7. Racism made any amendment, especially one that dealt with voting rights, a 
sticking point. Thus the Fourteenth does not touch voting rights except negatively in 
Section Two. 
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Problem One, therefore, is how a state can ratify an 
amendment but be denied representation in the national gov-
ernment. Problem One, however, is easy compared to Problem 
Two. With the South excluded, as it would be throughout the 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the Congress by 2/3 votes of its Northern 
members in both Houses proposed the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The new amendment could not receive the needed nineteen 
Northern ratifications. Therefore, to reach the three-fourths 
mark, some, perhaps all, states of the Confederacy were essen-
tial. With the exception of Tennessee (which ratified quickly 
and was rewarded with its Congressional seats), the Confederate 
states rejected the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress re-
sponded, after an extensive debate, by adopting a policy of mili-
tary reconstruction. It wiped out the existing Southern govern-
ments that had ratified the Thirteenth Amendment and replaced 
them with new governments, which were informed that they 
could not have Congressional representation until the Four-
teenth Amendment was ratified. Like Andrew Johnson facing 
conviction on the articles of impeachment, the South, too, 
switched. 
Problem Two requires explanation of how a state can be 
stripped of Congressional representation unless and until it 
agrees to a proposed constitutional amendment. Not surpris-
ingly, the text of Article V does not authorize excluding states 
from Congress unless they assent to proposed amendments. 
Conversely, Article V textually states "that no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate." 
One need not be a dimwitted hypertextualist to understand that 
no representation for the South is not equal representation with 
the North. 
With the South excluded and Johnson in a veto mode, the 
Republicans steeled themselves into a veto-proof majority and 
forwarded the Fourteenth Amendment to the states. Johnson 
told the South what it wanted to hear: don't ratify; the process is 
unconstitutional. The nation was treated to a very public consti-
tutional debate, and the 1866 elections were contested on the is-
sue of what to do about the South. 
The Republicans had to win at least 122 Northern seats to 
have the necessary majority in the House counting the South so 
as to continue the policy of not counting the South (until South-
erners behaved better).R Yet, a mere 122 seats would mean 
8. The risk was that if the Republicans did not have 122 and nevertheless still used 
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stalemate, for it would give the President more than enough 
Northern Democrats to sustain his vetoes through the life of the 
Fortieth Congress. But no stalemate occurred because the 1866 
elections were a spectacular Republican triumph. Republicans 
carried the House by 144-49, won every Northern legislature, 
and every contested gubernatorial race. By winning in the states 
that counted, the Republicans made them the states that were 
allowed to count. 
Meanwhile, Johnson clung to his former position and his 
hope for a different outcome in the 1868 elections. The lame-
duck Thirty-Ninth, however, saw the elections that had created 
the Fortieth as strengthening its own mandate. The result, after 
three months of intense debate, was the (First) Reconstruction 
Act of 1867 establishing military rule in the South in order to 
create those better-behaved governments that would ratify the 
Fourteenth. The Act explicitly stated that the newly constituted 
governments would be readmitted to Congress only when the 
Fourteenth Amendment received the necessary twenty-seven 
ratifications. To preclude Johnson from appointing Supreme 
Court justices, Congress passed a Court-shrinking statute that 
had three seats disappear until the Court was reduced to seven 
(which ought to include Lincoln's five appointees). To preclude 
a vacuum favoring Johnson, the Thirty-Ninth also passed a stat-
ute bringing the Fortieth into session immediately after the 
Thirty-Ninth expired. The Fortieth followed quickly with a Sec-
ond Reconstruction Act ordering the military to register the vot-
ers, black and white, that Congress deemed eligible. But that 
was just the beginning, for the Fortieth Congress was just as 
revolutionary as its predecessor. 
Worried generally about how Johnson might interpret their 
handiwork, the Republicans arranged for a special summer ses-
sion if necessary. It was. Attorney General Henry Stanbery is-
sued an opinion, agreed to by the Cabinet, gutting military re-
construction. The Republicans came into session and passed a 
Third Reconstruction Act overruling Stanbery's restrictive in-
terpretation. Afraid that the Supreme Court might declare mili-
tary reconstruction unconstitutional, the Republicans passed a 
statute stripping the Court of jurisdiction even though the case, 
Ex parte McCardle, had already been argued. Afraid that John-
their Northern majority status to exclude the Southern Democrats. Johnson might recog-
nize the Northern Democrats and their Southern compatriots as the true Congress. (p. 
17X) 
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son would use his Commander-in-Chief powers to thwart mili-
tary reconstruction, Congress passed the Tenure in Offices Act, 
and then the House proceeded to impeach Johnson (in part) for 
violating it. 
The same numerical logic that had been operating to ex-
clude the South was driving these events. If Johnson and the 
Democrats could successfully hold out, they could turn the 1868 
elections into a battle over whether to adopt the Fourteenth 
Amendment (and whether to seat the South without the Four-
teenth). In one sense, this was hardly an idle hope: Northern 
citizens would eventually tire of the constant political battles and 
some form of normalcy would reassert itself. The question was 
when. Because it might be 1868, the Republicans wanted the 
Fourteenth on the books before the elections. 
First, the Supreme Court yielded by doing nothing prior to 
the election. It could have handed McCardle down, as Robert 
Grier and Stephen Field desired, in the period between the ju-
risdiction-stripping bill's passage and Johnson's inevitable veto, 
or it could have held that the statute could not bar a decision in a 
case that was sub judice. But it did neither. Instead it waited to 
hear arguments about the statute's effect at its December 1868 
Term, thereby withholding its views on the constitutionality of 
Reconstruction. 
Second, after the Senate heard one of the House managers, 
Ben Butler, argue that Johnson could be convicted not only for 
actual crimes but also if his actions were "subversive of some 
fundamental or essential principle of government or highly preju-
dicial to the public interest," Johnson switched. (p. 227) ( empha-
sis in original) He assured moderate Republicans that he would 
do nothing to violate the laws or Constitution if acquitted, but 
more importantly, he ceased his obstruction of Congressional 
Reconstruction in the South. 
Next, Seward issued a wishy-washy proclamation noting the 
ratifications of six newly-formed Southern governments "avow-
ing themselves to be acting as" real legislatures. (p. 233) ( empha-
sis in original) He then gave the Fourteenth a conditional valid-
ity only if Ohio's and New Jersey's ratifications remained in 
effect after newly elected state legislatures revoked the two 
state's initial ratifications. A day later, the House and the Sen-
ate passed a concurrent resolution declaring the Fourteenth duly 
ratified with the assent of all the states that had ever ratified it. 
Seward then issued a new proclamation declaring that the Four-
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teenth Amendment had been adopted as part of the Constitu-
tion. 
Frank Blair, the Democrat's Vice Presidential candidate in 
1868, publicly advocated revisiting the issue of ratification after 
the election. But he and Horatio Seymour lost to Grant, and 
with their defeat the question of legality was settled. In Acker-
man's terminology, 1868 was a consolidation of the Republican's 
non-Article V victory. Five years later, the Court in the Slaugh-
ter-House Cases did not even pause over the validity of the new 
amendments. 
Unlike too many constitutional theorists for whom facts are 
an inconvenience to be presumed, Ackerman is a genuine re-
searcher. As such, he has rediscovered a constitutional history 
lost both to the complete repudiation of the Burgess-Dunning 
school9 and to the changes in the historical profession generally. 
Too many years ago, I had read that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had not been properly adopted, but I brushed the story 
aside as part of the phony Southern history. I was wrong. As 
Ackerman notes, Southerners did make this claim, and even su-
perb Northern historians, like Eric Foner, 10 now simply ignore it. 
Ackerman shows how thoroughly the constitutional ques-
tions were vetted at every step of the way (at least as much as 
Lincoln's suspending of habeas and issuing the Emancipation 
Proclamation were vetted). And Ackerman has fully integrated 
the constitutional with the political history of the period and 
done so as a first-rate lawyer. His discussions of Guarantee 
Clause jurisprudence or the way the Republicans handled the 
technicalities of the Tenure of Offices Act could not have been 
written so clearly by someone lacking legal training. Needless to 
say, I find his conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
not ratified in anything approaching conformity to the spirit of 
Article V completely persuasive. Possibly another reviewer of 
Y. John W. Burgess with Reconstruction and the Constitution /866-/876 (Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1ll02) and William A. Dunning with Reconstruction, Economic and Po-
litical (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1 Y07) were the two leading turn of the century his-
torians on Reconstruction. They propagated the view, lasting past mid-century, that Re-
construction was a terrible mistake imposed by venal radicals on an innocent South. This 
view was probably nowhere better expressed than in the title of Claude Bowers' best-
selling The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln (The Literary Guild of America, 
1929). The first paragraph of Bowers' preface perfectly captures the flavor of the Bur-
gess-Dunning school: "The prevailing note was one of tragedy .... Never have American 
public men in responsible positions, directing the destiny of the Nation, been so brutal, 
hypocritical, and corrupt. The Constitution was treated as a doormat on which politi-
cians and army officers wiped their feet after wading in the muck." Bowers at v. 
10. Eric Foner, Reconstruction (Harper & Row, 1YS8). 
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Transformations will offer a plausible explanation for how the 
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is not questionable, 
but I cannot. 11 
THE NEW DEAL 
The New Deal story, being more recent, is far better-known 
than Reconstruction; indeed many Con Law professors were 
both taught and teach some version of it. After the rejection of 
Herbert Hoover in 1932, there was an outpouring of legislation 
during FDR's First Hundred Days. In the 1934 elections, the 
Democrats scored an unprecedented mid-term victory, but, in 
1935 and 1936, the Supreme Court declared everything it could 
unconstitutional and seemed poised to strike down the more im-
portant legislation from the Second Hundred Days. After Roo-
sevelt's landslide in 1936, he offered his Court-packing plan. 
Roberts pulled his famous switch, and the Court initially sus-
tained the minimum wage, the National Labor Relations Act, 
and Social Security. This saved the Court from the indignity of 
packing, as the Court then reached results consonant with what 
the New Deal wanted. Anything any government did to regulate 
the economy was valid-indeed by 1941 unanimously valid. For 
Ackerman, the changed view of the central government's 
authority to regulate the economy is a second non-Article V 
constitutional transformation. 
Let's do numbers again. There were four votes on the 
Court against anything the New Deal did; the Four Horsemen 
were incorrigible. Thus, the New Deal could win only by a 5-4 
vote. 12 Second, Roosevelt was the first president to serve a full 
term without a single appointment to the Court. Third, the 
Court in 1936 was the oldest in American history. 13 Neverthe-
less, Roosevelt was more likely to lose by a 6-3 or a 9-0 vote than 
he was by a 5-4 vote; a single appointment would have helped 
but maybe not much. Or maybe not at all. As Ackerman notes, 
Hoover's appointees were not reactionaries. If Holmes had 
clung to his seat until 1933, then it would have been Senate ma-
jority leader Joe Robinson of Arkansas, not Cardozo, on the 
II. A "war powers" explanation, discussed in this article, still holds Article V 
problems. 
12. At one point, Ackerman inexplicably, and undoubtedly accidentally, refers to 
Nebbia as a 6-3 opinion. (p. 364) 
13. The geezers on the 1984 Court set a new record. L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People 
and Good Behavior, 12 Const. Comm. 195 (1995). 
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Court (probably changing the results in Nebbia, Blaisdell, and 
the Gold Clause Cases). If the oldest justice had died durinR 
Roosevelt's first term, Robinson would have replaced Brandeis. 4 
The accidents of judicial mortality did not cause the constitu-
tional crisis, no matter what our elders taught us. 
Unlike Reconstruction, there are several alternative expla-
nations for what happened during the New Deal. Both Acker-
man and I were taught that it was a constitutional restoration. 
Beginning with Lochner, the Court had gone astray. But Jones 
and Laughlin Steel returned the Court to the sensible interpreta-
tions of John Marshall in McCulloch and Gibbons. 15 More re-
cently, two scholars have offered explanations that down-play 
the idea that the changed jurisprudence was a revolution. Rich-
ard Friedman has suggested that it was the luck of the draw. 1" If 
Carter Coal and Butler had come first and Nebbia and Blaisdell 
had followed, then the switch in 1937 would look different and 
more naturally incremental. Somewhat relatedly, Barry Cush-
man has claimed that the key change was in Nebbia and it just 
took the Court \by which he means Roberts) some time to grasp 
its implications. 7 Furthermore, Cushman attributes the New 
Deal impasse to bad statutory drafting. Once the New Deal 
lawyers got the hang of things, they drafted better statutes which 
the Court sustained. 
These alternative accounts do not require a constitutional 
moment of higher law-making to explain what happened in 1937, 
and they are consistent with Roberts' own claim that had 
Tipaldo been presented properly, he would have sustained the 
minimum wage law then. Ackerman nevertheless believes that 
lawyers are wearing blinders. He holds a joint appointment in 
Political Science and prefers that discipline's more sensible and 
long-held understanding that the New Deal was a peaceful 
revolution in American constitutionalism to the legalist explana-
tion that it was either a fluke of mortality or just incrementalism. 
14. Roosevelt"s commitment to Robinson suggests that even the architect of the 
new order was not thinking seriously about the role of the Supreme Court and how it 
would relate to his proposed solutions to the Depression. 
15. John Marshall, premature New Dealer; somehow I don't see him sustaining the 
regulation of Farmer Filburn's wheat. 
16. Richard Friedman, Swirching Time and Ocher Thoughc Experimenrs, 142 U. 
Penn. L. Rev. 1891 (1994). 
17. Barry Cushman, Rechinking che New Deal Courc (Oxford U. Press, 1998) 
(Cushman does believe the doctrinal changes of the 1940s were revolutionary, not incre-
mental). 
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Instead of seeing the Court as obstructionist, Ackerman 
claims that "judicial resistance contributed to the democratic 
character of the outcome." (p. 312) First, it forced Roosevelt to 
choose between the corporatism of the National Industrial Re-
covery Act and the regulation of the Second Hundred Days. 
Second, it focused Roosevelt, the Republicans, and the Nation 
on the fundamental changes the New Deal was initiating. After 
Roosevelt's lengthy public "horse and buggy" attack on the 
Court for Schechter, the press engaged in various speculations 
about what the president's next constitutional step might be. 
The public debate focused all parties, and it required the people 
to choose in elections. Had the Court sustained the NIRA in 
Schechter, Roosevelt might have continued with that misguided 
corporatist approach and the nation might not have had the 
great debate on whether fundamental change was necessary. 
"The 1936 election would have occurred under foggier condi-
tions."1R But it did not. Instead "even the 17 million Americans 
who voted against Roosevelt in 1936 would find it hard to deny 
that the People had embraced the ideal of regulated capitalism 
with their eyes open." (p. 380-81) (emphasis in original) By 
waiting until after the 1936 elections, Roberts' switch was per-
fectly timed. The people had spoken. Nevertheless, it would 
have been better for Ackerman to acknowledge that the consti-
tutional issue could have been more clearly drawn since FDR 
never mentioned the Court during the 1936 campaign. The peo-
ple spoke and I think clearly, but perhaps not about the Court. 
Indeed, rather than ask whether the Court retreated too 
late, Ackerman asks the more provocative question: Did the 
Court retreat too soon? A frequent complaint about Acker-
man's thesis, powerfully put by Richard Posner in an acid review 
in The New Republic, quite reminiscent of the reviews of Foun-
dations, is that there is no text for the supposed-post-1936 consti-
tutional amendments. 19 Ackerman's response in advance (which 
Posner never mentioned in his review) was that if the Court had 
continued on its course, there probably would have been text as 
the overwhelming Democratic majorities in Congress used Arti-
cle V to create new amendments. But because the Court yielded 
so completely there was no need of textual amendments even 
though plenty were ready; indeed, the New York Times stated on 
18. ld. 
19. Richard Posner, This Magic Moment, The New Republic 32, 35 (April 6, 1998). 
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its front page in January 1937 that amendments were "one of the 
main issues awaiting the new Congress." (p. 316) 
Republicans let the Democrats lead the Court-packing fight, 
and much of the Democratic opposition revolved around the ap-
propriateness of Article V amendments. Roosevelt felt three 
decisive elections in four years gave him the mandate to go for-
ward. Democratic Senator Burton Wheeler, LaFollette's run-
ning mate in 1924, led the opposition. He wanted an Article V 
solution (one that would create a legislative override of Court 
decisions). There was not only a split over Article V, there was a 
split over Presidential versus Congressional leadership. Then 
the Court's switch "took the steam out of this great debate." (p. 
333) The Court-packing plan's support dropped five points after 
Jones and Laughlin Steel and five more after Van Devanter an-
nounced his retirement. With the debate largely over, the 
chances for a constitutional amendment were over as well. 20 
Hence Ackerman's "central thesis:" "in the American system, 
the Supreme Court largely determines whether a constitutional 
revolution will be codified in Article Five terms. Only if the Jus-
tices refuse to recognize the legitimacy of a transformation do 
the President and Congress have an incentive to take the Article 
Fivelath." (p. 315) (emphasis in original) This is clearly cor-
rect. 
What of the legalist critique? Ackerman acknowledges 
Friedman and Cushman but does not specifically treat their ar-
guments. Nevertheless, if his discussion of the Court is right, 
theirs is not. Like FDR, who was wary about Roberts' and 
Hughes' switch and therefore wanted more than just a replace-
ment for Van Devanter, Ackerman, as a doctrinalist, sees 1937 
as incomplete. In retrospect, we know the Court surrendered 
and that no New Deal measures were ever again declared un-
constitutional. But the New Dealers did not know that. The key 
transformation, now in the Con Law casebooks, is West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish, where an alternative ground offered was the 
20. Gregory Caldeira, Public Opinion and the U.S. Supreme Court: FDR's Court-
Packing Plan, 81:4 Am. Poli. Sci. Rev. 1139, 1148 (1987). Joe Robinson's death killed 
whatever chances a compromise Court-packing plan had. William Leuchtenburg, The 
Supreme Court Reborn 152 (Oxford U. Press, 1995). 
21. It does leave open the interesting possibility that the Court might enter an era 
where it was creating its own "constitutional moment." If the political branches agree or 
do nothing, has the Constitution changed? In Foundations, Ackerman worries that the 
Court might prematurely yield to the political branches before the~ could gain the neces-
sary authority to speak for the people. (p. 286) He never considers an overly active 
Court combined with the acquiescence of the political branches. 
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theory of the public subsidy of the employer. But this could 
have been ignored in the future. Neither Jones and Laughlin 
Steel nor Steward Machine overruled the precedents they were 
rejecting. 
The fundamental doctrinal changes began to be solidified 
beginning in 1938 when Hugo Black and then Stanley Reed 
joined the Court and made a return to the Old Order highly un-
likely. The doctrinal changes were then cemented before the 
1940 election with appointments to Felix Frankfurter, William 
0. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. Wendell Willkie challenged 
FDR on the third-term tradition, but not on the constitutionality 
of the regulatory state. 
In the eight years encompassing 1937-44, the New Deal 
Court created a new constitutional order, overruling thirty cases. 
That is two-thirds as many as had been overruled in the Court's 
previous history! 22 "When a lawyer consulted Darby, he found 
no indication that the Lochnerian principles elaborated over two 
full judicial generations were still to be taken seriously. The sig-
nificance of unanimity cannot be underestimated. Even when 
one or two Justices are willing to elaborate a doctrinal tradition, 
the older principles remain a vital part of the living constitu-
tion." (p. 373) (emphasis in original) But when no one is left to 
carry on even a dying tradition, "practical men and women of af-
fairs no longer ha[ve] any reason to learn or remember." (p. 
373) Ackerman ends his New Deal discussion with "the best for 
last." (p. 377) It is FDR's speech in Philadelphia on the 150th 
anniversary of the Constitutional Convention. Like Ackerman, 
Roosevelt drew contrasts between those who viewed the "Con-
stitution as a layman's instrument of government and those who 
would shrivel the Constitution into a lawyer's contract." (p. 377) 
The President noted the constant cry of "'unconstitutional"' 
whenever there was an "'effort to better the condition of our 
people."' (p. 377) "'Such cries have always been with us"' and 
he spoke of 1787, slavery, and the New Deal's efforts to rejuve-
nate the economy (and the judiciary). (p. 378) 
Ackerman can be justly proud of uncovering the speech, 
which so nicely ties Ackerman's three constitutional moments 
together. Yet Ackerman immediately criticizes Roosevelt's un-
22. To use a more familiar period, in the seven years encompassing 1963-69, the 
Warren Court overruled 33 prior decisions. When Warren replaced Fred Vinson, the 
Court had overruled 88 cases in its history. When Warren introduced Burger as the new 
Chief Justice, forty-five more precedents had been confined to the scrap heap of history. 
Lucas A. Powe,Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics (forthcoming 1999). 
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derlying assumptions. Roosevelt was arguing that separation of 
powers must allow "law to 'catch up' with life" and that delays 
were intolerable. (p. 380) Wrong, Ackerman notes; delay is the 
way our system determines whether those who claim to speak 
for the people truly do so. Only by sustained victories over 
time-like the Republicans in the 1860s and the Democrats in 
the 1930s-are dissenting institutions properly brought into line. 
"Legalistic resistance was not a pointless 'luxury"' as Roosevelt 
thought; rather, it is essential to the process of "legitimation" of 
fundamental change. (p. 380) 
As with Reconstruction, I find Ackerman's narrative de-
scriptively accurate. Furthermore, it is sprinkled with a number 
of illuminating "what ifs" that encourage the reader to think 
about potential alternatives. As with the discussion of Recon-
struction, Ackerman has unearthed far more contemporaneous 
nonjudicial discussion of constitutional issues than either the 
traditional historical or legal narratives have offered. What 
Ackerman shows is that the politicians, no less than the justices, 
were serious people who understood the constitutional issues 
facing the nation (even as they differed on appropriate solu-
tions). Indeed, as with the debates over the creation of the Bank 
of the United States, there is not an implausible case to be made 
that the politicians' sense of the Constitution is every bit as good, 
if not better, than the Justices'. 
CAN CONSERVATIVES WIN, TOO? 
A not unnatural reading of both the Storrs Lectures and 
Foundations (with similar hints in Transformations) is that Ack-
erman believes in history as progress, and progress comes only 
from more liberalism. 23 The constitutional implication of Ack-
erman's whiggish view of history seemed clear-only liberals get 
to engage in higher law-making. Ackerman's claim that Ronald 
Reagan should not have sent Robert Bork to the Senate told 
readers that the New Deal and the Warren Court were sacro-
sanct if Ackerman could be the constitutional king. (Ackerman 
now denies that he was one of those liberals who believes the 
Warren Court "[got it] right once and for all.") (p. 419) 
Transformations continues the same claims and indeed adds 
the further one that Newt Gingrich isn't leading a revolution 
(yet) either. I was very cool to Foundations because I believe 
23. Accord Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641,651 n.IO (1966). 
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that conservatives win elections, too, and that with winning 
comes some of the perquisites of governing. Transformations 
answers my qualms. 
It's numbers all over again. When Reagan defeated Jimmy 
Carter, the Republicans finally took control of the Senate, and 
that control would continue for six more years. Yet, the Repub-
licans were never able to push their Senate representation past 
54. Indeed, the number dropped to 53 after Reagan's slaughter 
of Walter Mondale. During the Reagan years, the Republicans 
never captured the House, and in the 1982 mid-term elections 
they lost 22 seats, dropping them to a piddling 167. Contrast the 
New Deal numbers. In 1934, the Republicans dropped from 117 
to 103 in the House and from 35 to 25 in the Senate; two years 
later the few Republicans left standing were almost eradicated. 
Republicans dropped 89 Congressmen and 16 Senators. The 
Reagan Republicans lost control of the Senate between the 
nominations of Antonin Scalia and Bork. Again, contrast the 
New Deal where after the Democratic losses in 1938, there were 
still 69 Democratic Senators available to confirm Frankfurter 
and Douglas.2~ 
Bork was an avowed agent of massive constitutional change. 
Why should the party of the status quo confirm him? If he had 
been nominated a year earlier instead of Scalia, he probably 
would have made it. But the election cycle makes it hard to con-
trol all branches of government, and without control of the Sen-
ate, controversial nominees face a bleak prospect.25 
Failed revolution still holds for Gingrich (although the jury 
is out awaiting future elections). Bob Dole was not exactly the 
candidate of revolutionary change, and, of course, he lost. It is 
quite possible that the Republicans will win the presidency in 
2000 as well as hold both Houses. If so, maybe we will see trans-
formative judicial appointments. Ackerman may be uneasy be-
cause beyond winning elections he demands that the constitu-
tional issues be clear to the people. Whether the Republicans 
would play by his rules is hardly certain, but Ackerman is now 
clear that conservatives can also change the Constitution in non-
Article V ways, if they win elections (and play by his rules). 
That clarification, if that is what it is, is progress and without it, 
Transformations would be decidedly less credible. 
24. Although four of them deserted Douglas, believing the taint of the SEC might 
make him too cozy with big business. 
25. Affirmative action nominees excepted. 
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ALTERNATIVES? 
While I have indicated that I find Ackerman's narrative 
persuasive, I suspect that that will not be a universal reaction. 
Others will offer alternative explanations that they find cogent. 
Such alternative explanations for Reconstruction and the New 
Deal are available, but in relation to Reagan, Ackerman's right. 
Ackerman does not discuss Lincoln and the Civil War very 
much, although he understands that much of what Lincoln did 
was of questionable constitutional validity. Lincoln crossed the 
line with habeas and probably with the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, but there is also the blockade (sustained by only one vote in 
the Prize Cases), the draft, and legal tender. Like the Court in 
Korematsu, we could announce that "war is hell" and leave the 
issues alone. Assuming we did so, why not just prolong the war-
time situation for three more years? We had a constitutional 
breakdown and when the Constitution got fixed and operative 
again, it was different. 
Ackerman treats this idea briefly but finds it very unaccept-
able because "it would place the Reconstruction amendments on 
a radically different, and much less attractive, constitutional 
foundation than all other parts of our Constitution." (p. 115) 
One answer is "so what?" The era ended thirteen decades ago, 
and we all like the Fourteenth Amendment now regardless of 
how it was born-and only Ackerman celebrates the way it was 
born. 
Ackerman also claims that a war powers-his phrase is 
"grasp of war" (p. 115)-rationale is bad history because the 
killing had stopped and because the argument slights the demo-
cratic basis of the choices made when genuine choices among 
constitutional solutions were available. The killing had indeed 
stopped, but its effects lingered, and to deal with the effects, the 
Republicans adopted a policy of military reconstruction. The 
military is, quite obviously, intimately connected to the war 
powers. Under the circumstances as Ackerman describes them, 
war powers is an economical explanation of how the Republi-
cans imposed their solution on the South. By 1862 Lincoln had 
already stated that the South '"cannot experiment for ten years 
trying to destroy the government, and if they fail still come back 
into the Union unhurt."'26 I have consistently told my Con Law I 
26. Quoted in James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American 
Revolution 81 (Oxford U. Press,l991). 
1998] ACKERMAN/A 563 
class that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are best 
understood as the terms of the peace. 
The war powers explanation, by cutting the legs off Acker-
man's theory with respect to Reconstruction, also leads to solv-
ing the New Deal problem Posner highlights-no text- by of-
fering a simple conclusion: Since Ackerman's theory fails at 
Reconstruction where, because of the text placed in the Consti-
tution, it is strongest, there is no need to go beyond the legalist 
explanation for the New Deal. 
Beyond the war powers solution, the best response to Ack-
erman on Reconstruction is to attempt to pull the plug on the 
underlying premise of his argument. Ackerman demands that 
"we the people" speak authoritatively over a substantial period 
of time. Surprisingly, perhaps because the answer is obvious, 
Ackerman does not spend much time asking who "we" are al-
though what he does say is an apt illustration of his whiggish 
viewpoint. 
As Ackerman winds up his discussion of the Framing, he 
notes that our white, male, property-owning forefathers were not 
perfect because they were not as inclusive as we are. Recon-
struction was better because African-Americans could vote in 
some Northern states and in the South under the Reconstruction 
Acts. The New Deal was better still because of amendments Fif-
teen, Seventeen, and Nineteen. (Presumably the Reagan era 
was the best of all because some teenagers had been added to 
the rolls.) "We the People" is best approximated with "the exer-
cise of popular sovereignty in the United States." (p. 124) 
The key constitutional questions of Reconstruction were 
decided by "the People themselves" by taking decisions away 
from "competing political elites and Washington" and decided 
"on their own responsibility." (p. 162) (emphasis in original) 
Did the Southern losers take the decisions away from political 
elites in Washington? Well, no. If the decisions were taken 
away, they were taken away by Northern victors. In the words 
of one of Ackerman's heroes, John Bingham: "The Republic, sir, 
is in the hands of its friends, and its only safety is in the hands of 
its friends." (p. 168) By Ackerman's own narrative, the North-
ern Republicans excluded the South, remade Southern govern-
ments, and mandated ratification of the Fourteenth as a condi-
tion of readmission to Congress. 
The Northern voters gave the Republicans overwhelming 
victories, but where do the Southerners come into this? Like the 
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Thirty-Ninth Congress, Ackerman never seriously counts 
them-although he does have a quote by William Pitt Fessenden 
to the effect that 95% of white Southerners were opposed to the 
Republicans. (p. 202) Assuming that the freed slaves were 
100% behind the Republicans, what is the balance? Ackerman 
never asks (although the answer is roughly 50-50). Because his 
model has a dissenting institution that yields to the sustained 
voice of the people, the South's function is to be obstructionist 
and then to yield. By yielding, they became part of the people 
agreeing to the Fourteenth Amendment. (Of course, they didn't 
yield. They ratified the Fourteenth, but nullified its enforcement 
for almost a century with persistent violence and obstruction.) 
Ackerman's model works a lot better when the dissenting 
institution is Rhode Island or Andrew Johnson's presidency or 
the Supreme Court. Once the South is in the picture, "we the 
people" look suspiciously Northern. And frankly, I like my ac-
quiescence more affirmative. Indeed, if "we" are the victorious 
Northerners forcing the Fourteenth down our defeated brothers' 
throats, then aren't we really talking war powers instead of 
higher law-making? Ockham's Razor could usefully be applied 
to pare "signaling," "triggering," "mandate," "consolidation" 
and especially "bandwagon" from the discussion. The adoption 
of the Fourteenth still doesn't conform to Article V, but it 
doesn't conform to Ackerman's specific theory either. 
There is a final way law professors could think of the ratifi-
cation problem- the way the Supreme Court ultimately chose to 
think about it. Coleman v. Miller held that there is no judicial 
function whatsoever in the amendment process, and what the 
political branches say is the final word. At one level, that is an 
open invitation to law professors not to think about it. After all, 
if the decision is just politics, then it belongs elsewhere, like in 
Political Science Departments. The invitation was so good that 
until Ackerman it had been all but universally accepted for over 
half a century. But the Congressional decision is not "all poli-
tics." Legal arguments will be made and might influence some 
politicians. The allure of Coleman v. Miller is that it caused gen-
erations to forget; that blessing vanished once Ackerman forced 
us to remember. 
Nevertheless, if either war powers or political questions of-
fers a theory that renders Ackerman's history less (or ir) rele-
vant, then maybe the same can be done to the New Deal. If so, 
his project can be accepted as the tour de force it is and simulta-
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neously ignored as theorizing by yet another Yalie who is too 
smart for his own good. 
I have already alluded to the alternative views of the New 
Deal both from the older generation and from Friedman and 
Cushman. To a considerable extent, both the latter alternatives 
turn on Nebbia. Basically the argument goes like this: if Nebbia, 
then no Lochner; if no Lochner, then no crisis. I think this is 
wrong factually and legally. Factually, the only state case during 
1935 and 1936 to enter the picture is Tipaldo. Assume Roberts 
votes to sustain the New York minimum wage law. We still have 
the undoings of the NIRA, the AAA, the Guffey Coal Act, the 
Railroad Retirement Act, and farm relief in Frazier-Lemke. 
That, not state efforts, was the crisis, and that is why the NLRA 
and Social Security were headed for oblivion in 1937 without a 
change of votes. 
For legal analysis Nebbia mistakes our world-view with 
theirs. In the post-1937 constitutional world, especially over 
time, Lochner came to symbolize everything that was wrong in 
the previous three decades. Hence the "Lochner era." But 
Lochner dealt with the substantive question of regulatory power. 
The New Deal was losing its laws because of retroactivity, be-
cause of the limits on the commerce power, and because of the 
idea that there were some things that were inherently local and 
therefore beyond any federal power. None of these had any-
thing to do with Lochner. Understanding the implications of 
Nebbia may well yield the constitutionality of the minimum 
wage, but it does not yield Jones and Laughlin Steel, much less 
its companion in Friedman-Har? Marks Clothing Co. (with its 
$2 million per year of business). 2 (On a different point, Nebbia 
did not influence Alton Railroad a year later which reads like a 
roadmap attack on the New Deal-and was, like Nebbia, a 5-4 
Roberts opinion.) Legally, something had to happen to sustain 
the New Deal, and that something began to happen in the spring 
of 1937. Give Roberts his "nonswitch" in West Coast Hotel; he 
nevertheless did switch in Jones and Laughlin Steel, Friedman-
Harry Marks Clothing, and Steward Machine, and those cases 
were by far the more important. 
If the legal alternative to Ackerman fails, how about the 
factual alternative? This rests with Roosevelt's silence about the 
Court during 1936. If the key to higher law-making is height-
27. NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., affirmed on the basis of Jones 
and Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 5~. 75 (1937). 
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ened public awareness, ought not the public be treated to a full 
discussion? Ackerman is more than happy to quote at length 
from Roosevelt's "horse and buggy" attack on the Court after 
Schechter and his speech on the 150th anniversary of the Consti-
tutional Convention. But the former was in May 1935 and the 
latter in September 1937. Even his "Fireside Chat" attack on the 
Court came in March 1937, months after his landslide victory. 
On Ackerman's own terms for the people to speak authorita-
tively, they must know what they are saying. 
As I have already indicated, I agree with Ackerman that the 
voters knew. The voters wanted an activist federal government 
dealing with the nation's economic problems. If the Court had 
stood in the way in 1937, the Court would have lost. Thus as 
with Reconstruction, I think there are alternatives to what Ack-
erman offers, but with the New Deal, I also think he has the bet-
ter of the facts and the debate. Maybe, because of his research, 
others will become more engaged, and alternatives will surface. 
Until they do, I think Ackerman's specific claim is valid. The 
Constitution changed during Reconstruction and the New Deal, 
and neither change complies with Article V. 
BUT WHERE'S THE TEXT? 
It is not nit-picking to note that if it is the people's Constitu-
tion, then they-and not just lawyers-ought to be able to read 
it.2R That works for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments 
however they found their way into the document, but the New 
Deal left no text. How are courts or "We the people" to inter-
pret the New Deal "amendments"? Ackerman suggests that the 
Americans during constitutional moments drew on the British 
analogies of the Convention/Parliament of 1688 and Lords-
packi_ng in 191~; p~rh~rs he should have added one more-an 
unwntten constitutiOn. 
28. Sandy Levinson would have me change the latter part of the sentence to "it 
would be preferable that they be able to read it." He added: "Then go trash Article Vas 
the cause of all the embarrassment.'' Sanford Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection 
(Princeton U. Press, 1995) (trashing it). 
29. I will leave for other reviewers the discussion of whether there were three and 
only three constitutional moments, especially since Ackerman has found a mini-fourth 
with foreign affairs and treaties. Other candidates might be Michael McConnell's Corn-
promise of 1877 as justifying Plessy or my personal favorite, 1948-52 as justifying McCar-
thyisrn. As any number of the reviewers of Foundations have pointed out, if no text is 
required at the end of a constitutional moment, then everyone can play. And who is to 
say that Ackerman's rules govern? 
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There are no perfect answers to where's the text, although 
looking, as Ackerman does, at the proposals for amendments 
during the New Deal might cause us to point to one or two and 
conclude that they encapsulate what the New Deal was all about. 
As an alternative, I have no trouble at all synthesizing the New 
Deal transformation because I do it in Con Law I every year. 
Amendment One: "[1) Congress shall have the power to regulate 
the economy in the general welfare. [2) A Congressional deter-
mination of the general welfare shall not be open to challenge in 
any court of law." Amendment Two: "The States shall have the 
power to regulate their economies in the general welfare, so long 
as the regulation does not interfere with Congressional policies 
or unduly interfere with interstate commerce." The two 
amendments might be better drafted, but I don't believe anyone 
can disagree that if the New Deal did amend the Constitution, 
my two amendments represent the substance of the transforma-
tion. 
The problem, however, is that I am quite sure that Acker-
man disagrees with me. Of course, he would go with my two, but 
killing Lochner was one thing; killing the possibility of protecting 
civil liberties was quite another. "Congressional debate on a 
second front was less advanced. There was a pervasive recogni-
tion of the Court's yeoman's service in protecting individual 
rights, but Congress found it hard to frame amendments that 
would preserve this function without causing other difficulties." 
(p. 338) Ackerman implies that had the process gone forward 
some civil liberties type amendment would have gotten through, 
and at a different point he gushes over one that would look like 
Footnote Four of Carotene Products. 
Ackerman offers no support for his claim of the "pervasive 
recognition." Furthermore, the Court's protection of individual 
rights in 1936 consisted of a few freedom of speech and the press 
cases, a rudimentary right to a fair trial, and the Lochnerian 
family values of Meyer and Pierce. That's not much to go on. 
Hence, on one hand, it is not surprising that Congressmen were 
finding it hard to write an appropriate amendment. On the 
other hand, if they had gotten over the analytical block, there is 
no evidence for Footnote Four. 
Possibly I am wrong about Ackerman's text being Footnote 
Four, since his one example of a nonequality right in Founda-
tions was Griswold and in Transformations the single most cited 
case unrelated to Reconstruction or the New Deal is Roe v. 
Wade. Neither is a good Footnote Four fit. Furthermore, Roe 
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doesn't fit at all in a volume on Reconstruction and New Deal 
history. So how did it get there? 
One way Roe fits is to go to higher generality. For a quarter 
century, the "project" of constitutional theory has been to ex-
plain (and far more often than not, justify,) Roe. Let me offer a 
nifty syllogism: Constitutional theory is about Roe. We the Peo-
ple is about constitutional theory. Ergo, We the People is about 
Roe. Okay, the syllogism is too simple-minded. But consider 
this: "The destruction of Roe, moreover, would have shaken the 
ground beneath all of the great landmarks built up by the Jus-
tices in the half-century between Roosevelt and Reagan." (p. 
492 n.lO) Read that sentence again. It should cause you to 
wonder whether Ackerman is a bad historian or a bad lawyer-
or perhaps, with the reviewers of Foundations, both. 
He said "all;" therefore: Overruling Roe places Brown v. 
Board in jeopardy because. . . Overruling Roe places Reynolds 
v. Sims in jeopardy because . . . Overruling Roe places New 
York Times v. Sullivan in jeopardy because ... Overruling Roe 
places Gideon, Miranda, Mapp etc. in jeopardy because .. . 
Overruling Roe places Heart of Atlanta in jeopardy because .. . 
Overruling Roe places Griswold in jeopardy because ... the dis-
tinctions between contraception before intercourse and after 
conception are too elusive to distinguish. Hmmm; okay score 
one possible, but only one, for Ackerman-although if one reads 
the commentary on Griswold through the end of the Warren 
Court, one will not find the slightest hin• that Griswold might be 
a wedge into creating a constitution right to an abortion. 
To put it mildly, the suggestion that overruling Roe would 
undercut fifty years of constitutional results is profoundly amiss 
(although it would make the Bowers dissent very shaky). My 
syllogism does not look so simple-minded; nor does Posner's 
conclusion that, compared to Ackerman's textless world, hyper-
textualism looks pretty good. 
The New Deal constitutional crisis was, as Ackerman 
knows, a crisis over the regulation of the economy. It was not a 
crisis over the right to choose between childbirth and abortion. 
To suggest that the New Deal constitutional synthesis means (or 
protects or justifies or even suggests or collateraly supports) Roe 
v. Wade is not only playing fast and loose with history and 
(non)text, it suggests a lack of seriousness. Ackerman's view of 
Roe detracts from an argument that is bound to be controversial, 
and it is bound to make those who were skeptical about Acker-
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man's thesis even more skeptical. We the People have not en-
dorsed Roe-although perhaps we have (through consistent poll 
results) endorsed Casey's compromise of a reasonably regulated 
right guaranteed by constitutional adverse possession. 
WITHER VOLUME THREE? 
There are a few hints in Transformations of what Ackerman 
will do in We the People: Interpretations, and they all point to its 
being Court-centered. It will try to clarify the judicial challenges 
that lie ahead by following "the Court as it struggled to reconcile 
older constitutional traditions of liberty and equality with newer 
affirmations of activist government for the general welfare." 
(pp. 349, 405) But it will also treat the "crucial problem of ero-
sion-and what can be done to solve it." (p. 386) 
A full chapter in Foundations introduced the problem of 
intergenerational constitutional synthesis, where Ackerman 
points to creating a flourishing individual-rights jurisprudence. 
In brief but provocative discussions of both Brown and Gris-
wold, he tried to illustrate the new synthesis the Court was nego-
tiating. Both cases, coming under the New Deal constitution, 
needed to accommodate the activist state with rights drawn from 
an earlier period (and not implicitly rejected by a later period). 
Thus Brown rests on equality and nationalism from the Recon-
struction; Griswold, individual liberties from the Framing. I 
found the discussion in Foundations too truncated to be at all 
convincing, but a full volume will offer ample space to cure that 
problem. A much bigger problem, however, is his view that Roe 
v. Wade is a center-piece of post-New Deal constitutional law on 
which the great landmarks are built. The easiest solution is to 
beat a hasty retreat into reality. Assuming that proves too far 
from Yale, a dominant part of Interpretations will have to be the 
defense of Roe. 
The problem of "erosion" is more ambiguous. Under-
standings do erode. Time passes. Erosion therefore seems in-
evitable. I am not sure what Ackerman deems the real problem 
of erosion to be, but with Posner I suspect he wishes us to main-
tain more fealty to our New Deal fathers than we have of late, 
continuing to believe that their path is the true path. In de-
scribing the New Deal's accomplishments, Ackerman states: 
"the Wagner Act gave disorganized workers new tools to bar-
gain effectively with their bosses; the Holding Company Act 
eliminated abusive concentrations of big capital; the Social Secu-
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rity Act guaranteed all workers the prospect of a decent old age 
after their usefulness to the market was over." (p. 302) Refer-
ring to the second statement, Posner contemptuously asks "who 
believes that anymore?" 
Implicit in both Foundations and Transformations is Ack-
erman's originalist position that "this" is our Constitution and it 
must be followed until changed by formal amendment or higher 
law-making. Unlike the Borkians, Ackerman has found a way to 
make originalism look more modern, but it still suffers from all 
the flaws of originalism. If the New Deal no longer seems rele-
vant to us, why not treat it as history rather than religion and 
make a series of incremental moves away from it? 
NONARTICLE v. AMENDMENT 
Ackermania? The post-New Deal constitution doctrine 
resting on Roe, yes; otherwise, no. Uncomfortable truths? 
Mostly. A book that, like John Hart Ely's Democracy and Dis-
trust so many years ago, will be a major factor in how we con-
ceive and teach the Constitution? You bet. 
Ackerman is right; the Constitution was fundamentally 
changed during Reconstruction and the New Deal. I join him in 
believing that the Fourteenth Amendment and the ability of 
Congress to regulate the economy for the general welfare are 
positive developments. I join him in believing that Article V 
cannot describe with acceptable accuracy what occurred. I join 
him in believing that non-Article V higher law-making will occur 
at some unforeseeable future time. Where we part is what to 
make of it. I am less enthusiastic about his belief that the higher 
law-making process can be regularized by watching its stages 
through his political science checklists. And I am not the whig 
that he is. The future does not hold infinite progress; it holds in-
finite change. 
